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Allison Zippay
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This	mixed-methods	study	draws	from	social	network	theory	to	exam-
ine	disclosure	 and	help	 seeking	 for	 intimate	partner	violence	 among	
microfinance	 participants	 in	 Bangladesh.	 This	 study	 uses	 data	 on	
women	 from	 the	 nationally	 representative	Bangladesh	Demographic	
and	Health	Survey	2007	and	from	in-depth	interviews	with	30	micro-
finance	 participants	 in	Dhaka.	 Propensity	 Score	Matching	 analyses	
indicated	that	 increase	 in	social	contacts	due	to	microfinance	partic-
ipation	was	 not	 associated	with	 disclosing	 IPV.	Responses	 from	 the	
urban	sample	indicated	that	reasons	for	nondisclosure	include	feelings	
of	shame,	stigma,	and	fear	of	being	perceived	as	weak	by	others.	Impli-
cations	regarding	how	microfinance	organizations	can	tap	participant	
networks	as	mechanisms	for	change	are	discussed.
Key	words	Intimate	partner	violence	(IPV)	disclosure;	poverty;	micro-
finance;	Bangladesh
 Microfinance programs have emerged across the world as an 
anti-poverty tool directed towards marginalized groups (Arun 
& Hulme, 2008; Counts, 2008; Goetz & Gupta, 1996; Hartarska 
& Nadolnyak, 2007; Khavul, 2010). In Bangladesh, microfinance 
entails financial services, predominantly micro-loans, to start mi-
cro-enterprises targeted to women (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, 
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& Kinnan, 2015; Counts, 2008). Several countries in Asia and Af-
rica now have a long history of microfinance; research suggests 
that microfinance may ease the depth of family poverty and also 
has the potential to empower participants with enhanced eco-
nomic and social resources, and opportunities for self-determi-
nation (Counts, 2008; Hudon & Myer, 2016). Such resources in-
clude increased instrumental and informational social networks 
that microfinance participation facilitates by way of contacts gen-
erated through business ownership, and via interactions with 
microfinance program participants and staff.
 Poverty rates within Bangladesh have fallen dramatically in 
the past decades, but still affect about 25% of the population 
(bdnews24, 2016). In Bangladesh, over 30 million women par-
ticipate in microfinance programs (Lachman, 2011). Within the 
country, patriarchal structures and intimate partner violence 
(IPV) also remain prevalent, with estimates of between one-to-
three quarters of all women having experienced IPV (Murshid, 
Akincigil, & Zippay, 2016; Schuler et al., 2008). Prosecution of 
IPV, however, remains low (Anwary, 2015). 
 It has been suggested that participation in microfinance 
programs may play a role in prompting greater individual 
help-seeking for IPV, as women assume more authority in their 
roles as entrepreneurs, and connect with wider and more di-
verse social networks and informational resources outside their 
homes (Murshid, 2013).
 This study used mixed methods to explore microfinance par-
ticipation and IPV disclosure among social networks of women 
in Bangladesh. Data from a nationally representative sample of 
ever-married women from the Bangladesh Demographic and 
Health Survey of 2007 were examined and juxtaposed with 
qualitative data collected from 30 women in Dhaka. The study 
examined associations between microfinance participation and 
the use of social networks to disclose IPV. Granovetter’s (1973, 
1983, 1995) concept of the “strength of weak ties” provided a 
framework for analyzing social networks as a mechanism for 
intervention involving microfinance programs and interper-
sonal interactions. The findings have implications for the ways 
in which gendered economic development via microfinance 
programs may be intentionally directed toward resources for 
social development such as IPV policy and intervention.
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Literature Review
Microfinance
 Microfinance in Bangladesh emerged in the 1970s as a re-
search project by Mohammad Yunus of Chittagong University. 
Experimenting with small group credit models, he found that 
even small amounts of money had the potential to help indi-
viduals alleviate or reduce their poverty, if they were able to 
invest that money in self-sufficient micro businesses. He created 
Grameen Bank to provide banking services to the poor, par-
ticularly in the form of micro loans in the absence of collateral 
(Counts, 2008; Yunus, 2003). 
 Microfinance organizations use a group-lending model to 
ensure repayment of loans in the absence of collateral. Five to 
eight individuals form a lending group in which all individu-
als are responsible for repayment of individual loans. Microfi-
nance organizations target women based on studies indicating 
that women are better borrowers with high repayment rates 
(Counts, 2008; Pitt, Khandker, & Cartwright, 2006; Pitt, Chow-
dhury, & Millimet, 2003; Yunus, 2003). In addition, women are 
more likely to invest in their families’ nutrition and education, 
particularly girls’ education (Pitt & Khandaker, 1998). 
 In addition to reducing poverty, goals of microfinance in-
clude the empowerment of women (Banerjee et al., 2015; Counts, 
2008). Many microfinance organizations provide nonfinancial	as 
well as financial services, such as health, wellness, and educa-
tion services (Dunford, 2001). These are meant to improve social 
development as well as macro economic outcomes, but research 
has indicated that while microfinance participants are more 
likely to send their daughters to schools, provide them with nu-
trition, and use contraceptives to gain control over their own 
bodies (Murshid & Ely, 2016; (Pitt & Khandaker, 1998), changes 
in health, education, and empowerment among women in mi-
crofinance-saturated neighborhoods are not significant (Baner-
jee et al., 2015). This is perhaps because few organizations pro-
vide such additional services, and these services are provided 
to organization members only, which excludes non-participants 
from access to such services.
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Prevalence	of	IPV
 Intimate partner violence (IPV), or domestic violence, has 
been defined as a systematic effort to subordinate and margin-
alize an intimate partner using coercive and exploitative tac-
tics including physical violence, psychological violence, sexu-
al abuse, and financial abuse (Holden, 2003; Huang, Postmus, 
Vikse, & Wang, 2013; Postmus, 2014). The causes of IPV are var-
ied and complex in different parts of the world, but the effects 
are universally condemned as a violation of human and person-
al rights. In Bangladesh, IPV remains a pervasive and normal-
ized social problem and is estimated to affect between 25 to 70 
percent of women across the socioeconomic spectrum (Begum, 
2005; Koenig, Ahmed, Hossain, & Mozumder, 2003; Naved, 
Azim, Bhuiya, & Persson, 2006; Schuler et al., 1996; Schuler et 
al., 2008).
 
Laws	and	Legal	Recourse	Available	for	Women
 The Domestic Violence Prevention and Protection Act in 
Bangladesh was enacted in 2010 to meet the obligations for the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW)—an international treaty adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly in 1979, and Article 28 of 
the Bangladesh Constitution, that makes the advancement of 
women and children a special priority. Under the Act, physical, 
psychological, financial, and sexual violence has been criminal-
ized, and children who are or have been at risk of experiencing 
violence in their families can seek recourse under this Act. Ac-
cordingly, women are to be given a menu of options, including 
medical and legal aid services, to which they can avail them-
selves once they file a complaint against their abusive partners. 
The Act allows judicial magistrates the power to intervene in 
violent situations by issuing interim orders, including protec-
tive orders, residence orders, maintenance orders, and safe cus-
tody orders to protect women who experience IPV, the breach of 
which are punishable by law, including imprisonment ranging 
from 6 months to 24 months and fines up to Tk. 1 lac and com-
munity service (Khatun & Rahman, 2012).
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Social	Services	for	IPV
 There are basic, yet limited, services available for women 
who seek help, particularly in urban areas. IPV services pro-
vided by the national government are focused on the provision 
of temporary shelter. There are two “One Stop Crisis Centers” 
in the country, one in Dhaka Medical College Hospital and 
the other in Rajshahi Medical College Hospital, where women 
and children can obtain services including medical help, po-
lice intervention, counseling and mental health treatment, fo-
rensic tests, and shelter. Non-government organizations are at 
the helm of providing legal services, (e.g., Bangladesh Nation-
al Woman Lawyers Association [BNWLA] and Ain O Shalish 
Kendra [ASK]), as well as campaigning for women’s rights (e.g., 
Women for Women and Nari Pokhho) (ASK, 2015).
Prevalence	of	Help-Seeking
 Among IPV service providers, an individual’s disclosure of 
domestic violence to a friend, family member, professional or 
others is emphasized as a critical action and decision point on the 
path to help seeking for IPV (Postmus, Severson, Berry, & Yoo, 
2009). Research indicates that women’s decisions to seek help for 
IPV depend on myriad individual, familial, and structural fac-
tors (Liang, Goodman, Tummala-Narra, & Weintraub, 2005). 
 In countries of South Asia, like Bangladesh, women are par-
ticularly limited to seek recourse for intimate partner violence 
given barriers on all levels: stigma and shame on the personal 
level, family pressure to protect family honor and reputation, 
on the familial level, and economic dependence and classic pa-
triarchal hierarchies on the structural level (Naved et al., 2006). 
Other studies indicate that factors associated with greater 
help-seeking for IPV among women in Bangladesh include 
severity and frequency of violence, both physical and verbal; 
education beyond 10th grade; employment; and social support 
(Dalal, 2011; Naved et al., 2006; Schuler, Bates, & Islam, 2008). 
 Nevertheless, the number of women who seek help for IPV 
remains extremely low, in part because women are often dis-
missed when they do file complaints; police reports indicate 
that between 2010 and 2012, 109,621 allegations of violence were 
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made by women to law enforcement agencies, but only 6,875 
cases were taken forward, while others were dismissed as false 
(Haq, 2012). The 2007 Bangladesh Demographic and Health Sur-
vey reports that a “culture of silence” remains pervasive among 
women there; only about 30% of respondents of their nationally 
representative sample who had experienced IPV said that they 
had told someone about the abuse (NIPORT, 2009).
Conceptual	Model	Based	on	Social	Network	Theory
 Research applying social network theory indicates that so-
cial networks that are more diverse in composition (including 
contacts across a variety of categories such as family, friends, 
work colleagues, school contacts, medical personnel, etc.) and 
that include “weak” ties (friends of friends, less intimate con-
tacts), are associated with greater access to informational, eco-
nomic, and social resources, and with adaptation to change 
(Bott, 1971; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Granovetter, 1973; John-
son, 1994; Lin, 1999; Madsen & Servais, 1997; Rankin, 2002; Well-
man & Wortley, 1990). Participation in microfinance may lead to 
an increase in the social network contacts of individual women, 
because the group-lending model of microfinance focuses on 
making each individual responsible for the loans obtained by 
all members in that group. This allows women to be more con-
nected to, and invested in, other women who are in their lending 
group, as well as to the organizational personnel that adminis-
ter the loans. 
 In addition, as micro business entrepreneurs, women are 
more likely to be in contact with a wider range of community 
associates as they interact with vendors, customers, and oth-
ers in their roles as micro-finance entrepreneurs; their sphere of 
interaction broadens beyond the home and their husband and 
children. Their roles as business owners provide them a stance 
associated with greater status and economic means, as well as 
access to training and information provided by the micro-fi-
nance loan officers and other business personnel. 
 The access to wider social network contacts may provide 
women with more opportunities for disclosure and help seek-
ing in the face of IPV, as well as access to wider and more diverse 
resources. As such, increased social contacts of the women may 
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allow for increased information transfer between individuals, 
as well as increased social support. These relationships have 
the capacity to exert social influence over individuals while pro-
viding support and social capital, as microfinance participants’ 
access to personal resources and opportunities to engage in 
help-seeking behavior increase (Jones & Ferguson, 2009; Mur-
shid, 2013; Rankin, 2002). No recent research, however, has in-
vestigated associations between microfinance participation and 
IPV disclosure, to the best of our knowledge.
Methods
 The present study uses data from the nationally represen-
tative Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey 2007 (Na-
tional Institute of Population Research and Training [NIPORT], 
Mitra and Associates, & Macro International, 2009), and qual-
itative interviews with 30 women who access microfinance in 
Dhaka, Bangladesh, to examine the association between micro-
finance participation and IPV disclosure among and help-seek-
ing social networks, and provide an exploration of the context 
in which microfinance participation may promote expanded 
social network contacts and potentially help-seeking behaviors. 
Primary	Research	Questions
 We have two primary research questions: (1) Are women 
participating in microfinance more likely to disclose IPV to a 
social network contact compared to women who do not partici-
pate in microfinance? And (2) What is the context of the hypoth-
esized link between microfinance participation and disclosure 
and help-seeking social networks?
Description of Quantitative Study
Data
 The current study uses the Women’s Questionnaire from 
the Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey 2007 (NIPORT 
et al., 2009) that surveyed 10,400 households including 10,996 
ever-married women between the ages of 15 and 49 years. The 
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survey was designed to generate nationally representative esti-
mates for the entire nation, including urban and rural areas, and 
six major divisions of Bangladesh: Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, 
Rajshahi, Barisal, and Sylhet. 
Sampling
 The sampling frame for the BDHS 2007 (NIPORT et al., 2009) 
was created from the Population Census of Bangladesh ob-
tained from the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS, 2001). The 
sampling frame was comprised of 259,532 enumeration areas 
(EAs), defined as “convenient number of dwelling units which 
serve as counting units for the census with an average size of 
around 100 households” (NIPORT et al., 2009, p. 239). A two-
stage stratified sampling strategy was used. First we selected 
enumeration areas, and then women from 30 households from 
each enumeration unit were selected for interviews. 
 In the present study, the sample analyzed was restricted to 
individuals who indicated in the survey that they experienced 
IPV, and who answered the questions regarding disclosure and 
help seeking. The survey asked respondents, “Does/did your 
(last) husband/partner ever do any of the following things to 
you: push you, shake you, or throw something at you; slap you; 
twist your arm or pull your hair; punch you with his fist or with 
something that could hurt you; kick you, drag you, or beat you 
up; try to choke you or burn you on purpose; threaten or attack 
you with a knife, gun, or any other weapon; physically force 
you to have sexual intercourse with him even when you did not 
want to?” Question responses were yes or no. 
 Upon accounting for missing values for each variable (by 
list-wise deletion) and restricting the dataset to individuals who 
responded to the questions of interest, the sample size was first 
reduced to 4,163. Of this number, 1,003 women reported experi-
encing IPV; 805 responded to questions about seeking help for 
IPV. This (n = 805) is the sample size of the quantitative portion 
of the current study that focuses on IPV disclosure.
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Quantitative	Measures
 IPV	 disclosure was used as a dependent variable, and in-
dependent variables included microfinance participation, and 
control variables that have been associated in previous research 
with help seeking for IPV, including income status, paid em-
ployment, education, and age. 
 IPV disclosure from a social network contact was measured 
based on the open-ended BDHS (NIPORT et al., 2009) survey 
question to women who had experienced IPV in the past 12 
months, “Did you tell anyone about your husband hurting you?” 
with a yes or no answer. A follow-up question asked, “Who did 
you tell”? (respondents could list as many as they chose). IPV 
disclosure was a dichotomous variable coded as “1” if yes and 
“0” if they did not tell anyone. The question regarding disclo-
sure was asked immediately after questions about whether or 
not the respondent had experienced IPV. 
 Microfinance	 participation was measured by a dichotomous 
variable where “1” indicated that women participated in at least 
one of the four major microfinance organizations (Grameen 
Bank, ASA, BRAC, and Proshika), and “0” indicated that they 
were not a member of any microfinance organization. 
 As part of BDHS 2007 (NIPORT et al., 2009), respondents 
were asked about their employment status. As such, 1 indicat-
ed that women were employed for pay, and 0 indicated women 
were not employed.
 Economic	status was measured using a “wealth index” con-
structed by BDHS 2007 (NIPORT et al., 2009) using data on own-
ership of durable goods and dwelling characteristics (such as 
bicycles, television sets, source of drinking water, sanitation fa-
cilities, and construction materials). Wealth was dichotomized 
as “wealth assets = 1” if respondents scored 2 and above, and 
“0” if respondents scored a 1 or below (and labeled “no wealth 
assets”).
 The BDHS 2007 documented age in continuous as well as cat-
egorical form. In the current study, the variable was used in its 
categorical form when applied in the univariate analyses, and in 
its continuous form when used in the multivariate analysis.
 The BDHS 2007 dataset included information on respondent 
education level. That information was presented in categorical 
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format, grouping individuals based on whether they had no 
education, primary education, secondary education, or higher 
than secondary education. 
Statistical	Analysis
 Descriptive statistics were computed for all variables, and 
analyses using propensity score matching techniques were 
then conducted to assess whether women who participated in 
microfinance were more likely to disclose IPV to someone in 
their social network, to account for endogeneity and selection 
biases. The women in the two groups were matched based on 
propensity scores calculated using a probit model, irrespective 
of microfinance participation. Microfinance participants were 
matched with non-participants with the most similar propen-
sity score, using one-to-one nearest neighbor matching with no 
replacement with the common support restriction. The Propen-
sity Score Matching (PSM) model was computed using psmatch2 
function on Stata13 LP, which estimated the effect of microfi-
nance by measuring the average effect of treatment on the treat-
ed (ATT), while accounting for sample weighting and the com-
plex research design of the BDHS 2007 (NIPORT et al., 2009). 
The post-matching sample size was 10,128 women, reduced 
from the total sample size of 10,996.
 The ATT was bootstrapped with 2000 repetitions to confirm 
findings. PSM was chosen as the analytical tool to make the 
findings comparable as closely as possible to findings from a 
quasi-experimental study, accounting for endogeneity and se-
lection biases.
 
Description	of	Qualitative	Study
 Purposive sampling was used to recruit 30 women who par-
ticipated in microfinance in a slum—an area of extreme pover-
ty —in the city of Dhaka. The interviews were conducted by 
the first author in the Bengali language. The study received ap-
proval from a university Institutional Review Board (IRB), and 
oral consent was obtained in Bengali from each participant. The 
interviews took on average approximately 90 minutes to com-
plete. The data were recorded manually by the lead author and 
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a research assistant and were later transcribed and translated by 
the lead author, before analysis using Atlas ti. Participants were 
recruited with the help of a local schoolteacher whose students 
were children of microfinance participants. The schoolteacher 
introduced the lead author to participants, after which consent 
was obtained and interviews conducted. The interviews were 
held at the local school, given its close proximity to the dwell-
ings in which the microfinance participants resided. As is the 
norm in Bangladesh, and other very low-income countries (NI-
PORT et al., 2009), participants were not paid, so as to ensure 
that individuals did not participate in the interview solely for 
the associated monetary compensation. 
 Respondents were asked about their experiences with do-
mestic violence, its association with microfinance participation, 
and their status in the household as a result of their access to 
microfinance. Questions were framed matter-of-factly, without 
judgment, and questions were modified based on how much or 
little participants shared; some were more forthcoming, others 
needed follow up questions. The initial questions were broad, 
such as, “tell me about your life, what do you do?” As the re-
spondents revealed their stories, the questions got narrower: 
“Where did you hear about microfinance? Why did you decide 
to access microfinance? Whose decision was it to access micro-
finance?” Questions were also asked about their personal lives: 
“When did you get married? How did your husband feel about 
your participation in microfinance? Did your husband ever hurt 
you physically?”
 Their experiences with help seeking in various difficult sit-
uations, including IPV, were also discussed. Questions were 
asked about their friends and family members, who they were 
and where they lived, and the kinds of help they have received 
from them in the past. Questions about help-seeking social net-
works were asked after the questions about experiencing IPV. 
Then, they were specifically asked if they told others about 
their IPV or sought help from members of their lending group, 
friends, or family members, and the reasons for which they se-
lected the people from whom they sought help.
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Rationale	for	Using	Mixed-Methods
 The quantitative portion of the study examines nationally 
representative data and investigates associations between the 
variables of interest: microfinance participation, IPV, and dis-
closure among social network contacts. The qualitative portion 
provides an examination of the context for these associations, 
and why these links may or may not exist. The key rationale 
for conducting the in-depth interviews was to generate insight 
into the context of findings from the quantitative portion of the 
study, and to suggest questions for future research. 
Results
Quantitative	Study	Results
 Twenty four per cent of the study population of ever-mar-
ried women said they experienced IPV (N = 1,003). Of those, 805 
women answered the question about IPV disclosure. Of the 805 
women, 70.9% (n = 569) reported that they did not disclose their 
experience of IPV, while 21.9 % (n = 236) reported that they told 
someone about the IPV (see Table 1). Of those who disclosed, 
most disclosed to family: parents (11.74%; n = 95), siblings (6.3%; 
n = 51), parents-in-law (7.39%; n = 60), and other relatives (10%, 
n = 81); 11.87% (n = 96) said they told neighbors, and 9 (1.11%) 
disclosed to friends. Only two respondents sought help from 
the police; one from a counselor; one from a health worker; 0 to 
a religious cleric; 0 to NGO personnel; 15 to local leaders; and 4 
to others (see Table 2).  
 Propensity score matching estimate was implemented us-
ing psmatch2 function in Stata 13. Table 2 shows the results 
from the probit regression that was used to estimate the pro-
pensity score of microfinance participation. Table 3 indicates the 
post-matching results of the estimation of the average effect of 
treatment on treated (ATT). The results allow for a comparison 
between the unmatched and matched samples of treatment and 
control groups. The common support from psmatch2 indicated 
that 7,350 were “untreated” while 2,778 were “treated,” which 
means 7,350 women were in the control group and 2,778 were 
in the treatment group (microfinance). The unmatched sample 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the study population
     Sample  Population
    Size  Distributiona
All    805  100.0
Key Dependent Variable   
Disclosed IPV   
    No    569  70.9
    Yes    236  29.1
Independent Variables   
Microfinance	 	 	
   No    510  63.6
   Yes    295  36.4
Wealth Assets   
   No    385  51.1
   Yes    420  48.9
Respondent Age   
   15-24    355  44.2
   25-34    291  37.1
   35-44    126  14.5
   45+    33  4.1
Age Difference 
(Husband’s age—Wife’s age)   
      <9    482  57.6
     10-19    284  37.9
      20+    39  4.4
Educational Difference   
   No Difference    279  36.2
   Husband More Educated   271  30.6
   Wife More Educated   255  33.2
Respondent Education   
   No education    323  35.9
   Primary    251  34.2
   Secondary    228  28.2
   Higher    21  1.7
Respondent Partner’s Education   
   No education    323  43.7
   Primary    251  30.3
   Secondary    183  21.6
   Higher    48  4.4
Currently Employed   
   No    555  66.8
   Yes    250  33.2
Note. a Weighted sample; numbers rounded up to 1 decimal point and may 
not add up to 100
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Table 2. Probit regression from psmatch2 in Stata to estimate propen-
sity scores of participation in microfinance
Microfinance	Participation	 	 	 Coefficient	(S.E)
Wealth Assets     -0.15 (0.03)*
Age     0.004  (0.006)*
Age Difference between Spouse   0.006 (0.002)*
Educational Difference between Spouses  0.0002 (0.002)
Respondent Education 
     No Education 
     Primary Education    0.04 (0.04)
     Secondary Education    -0.13 (0.05)*
     Higher Education    -0.50 (0.04)*
Husbands’ Education    -0.50 (0.04)*
     No Education     -0.50 (0.04)*
     Primary Education    -0.50 (0.04)*
     Secondary Education    -0.50 (0.04)*
     Higher Education    -0.50 (0.04)*
Employment     -0.50 (0.04)*
Constant     0.70 (0.06)*
Number of Observations    17,749
Log likelihood     -11051.214
Log-Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square   959.88
Prob. > Chi Square    0.00
Pseudo R2     0.04
Note. *p<.05; There are observations with identical propensity score values. 
Sort order is random.
Table 3. ATT Estimate from psmatch2
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of microfinance participants and non-participants shows a sta-
tistically significant difference of 1.1 percentage points in terms 
of seeking help, indicating that microfinance participants are 
significantly more likely to seek help for IPV than non-partic-
ipants; however, this estimate does not account for selection 
and endogeneity biases. The ATT (matched) estimation, which 
does account for selection and endogeneity biases, presents a 
different picture. The difference in IPV disclosure between mi-
crofinance participants and non-participants is 0.5 percentage 
points, but this estimate is not significant at the 0.05 level. This 
suggests that women who participate in microfinance are not 
significantly different from women who do not participate in 
microfinance in terms of their disclosure, when the compari-
son is made between women who have similar propensities to 
participate in microfinance. Bootstrapping the ATT 2000 times 
similarly yielded insignificant results, which further corrobo-
rates this finding.
Qualitative Study Results
 
 The qualitative study was conducted to understand the con-
text and nuances of respondent experiences with microfinance 
participation, IPV and its disclosure within their social networks.
Microfinance	participation
 The 30 respondents ran a variety of microfinance business-
es: retail trading in fruits, vegetables, or fishes; snack shops; and 
tea stalls. The women ranged in age from 18 to 49 years and all 
were married and had either young or adult children. All of the 
respondents lived in crowded, urban areas of extreme poverty 
in Dhaka known as “bosti” or slums. Dwellings were mostly 
jerry-built, including tents and shacks and houses assembled 
from a jumble of found materials, such as jute and plastic bags, 
old vinyl billboards, bamboo mats, and odd pieces of wood or 
metals. Most housed extended families, including husband and 
wife and children, adult parents or in-laws, and sometimes ad-
ditional relatives in need of a place to stay.
 The respondents described a variety of ways in which they 
became involved in microfinance: some were recruited by loan 
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officers visiting the bosti; others were brought in through par-
ticipating family or close friends or neighbors; and some con-
nected via more distant contacts: 
“My friend’s husband’s sister gave my name to a woman who 
came looking for people to give loans to, and then contact-
ed me.” “My landlord’s friend came over one day and was 
talking about her micro-business and said we should try it.”
 Running a microfinance business did not lift these women 
out of poverty. Rather, the small income generated from their 
micro-businesses eased extreme poverty to some degree, and 
provided basic necessities and some additional material goods:
Now … I can provide my family with food on a daily basis. I 
am not working the streets as a beggar…I can send my chil-
dren to school; I am not dependent on the income they bring 
in as beggars. I can clothe them … [Samina]
In describing their experiences with running a business, the 
women talked about the tasks of entrepreneurship that took 
them out of their homes and into the community to buy stock, 
sell their goods, conduct banking, etc. They spoke of expanded 
social contacts and interactions with people, including microfi-
nance loan officers and staff, group lending members, custom-
ers, and vendors and business associates. 
In terms of knowing more people, there are officers from the 
organization that we now know … I have a lot of repeat cus-
tomers in my business, and in some ways they have become 
my friends … So I have made new connections in that way. 
I feel that because I am now a businesswoman, with status 
and money, more people are willing to be friends with me…
They ask how the business is going, how I am doing, and so 
on. Most of those people are microfinance recipients too. So, 
basically, there is an increase in social networks that comes 
from our mutual respect …
Intimate	Partner	Violence
 Each of the 30 women interviewed said that they had ex-
perienced physical violence from their husbands. Most spoke 
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of the violence matter-of-factly, as a routine part of life. “Yes, of 
course, my husband hits me once in a while,” and “I didn’t like 
getting beaten up, but these things happen in marriages” were 
two responses that were echoed, in substance, by almost two-
thirds of the women. Their experiences ranged in severity, and 
some women indicated that abuse had lessened or stopped in 
recent years:
My husband used to beat me when we first got married. I was 
young. I didn’t know how to run a household and he used to 
get upset and hit me. Now I’m old, my husband is older. He 
doesn’t hit me anymore.
My husband hits me to show disapproval when I do some-
thing that he doesn’t like. But I still do those things. He will 
find a reason to hit me even if I stop. For example I like eat-
ing sour berries, and he tells me I waste money on them. All 
husbands hit their wives. It’s okay but it’s also embarrassing. 
I don’t like admitting to it, especially to my mother. When she 
calls to ask I tell her I am happily married. 
Disclosure	and	help	seeking
 When asked if they had told others about the physical vio-
lence by their husbands, about 60% of the respondents said no. 
Every disclosure or help request involved close family, friends, 
or neighbors. Not one of the respondents sought formal help 
through the legal system or law enforcement agencies, or coun-
selors, or health professionals/shelters. 
 Among those who did not seek help, several women said 
they were ashamed to talk about the violence in their lives with 
family members and friends. “Isn’t it shameful? It is, right?” 
Shaila counter-questioned me. “What will they say about my 
husband if they know he hits me? And what will they think of 
me? So no, I don’t tell anyone. It’s my private problem, not for 
the world to know.” 
 Others suggested that they did not share with their family 
because they didn’t want to upset them. As Morjina said:
I don’t ask for help. Even with family members … I don’t want 
to share this sadness. My mother will feel sad, she will worry 
about me. It’s best she thinks I’m doing fine.
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 The shame of experiencing violence, as voiced by the respon-
dents, was difficult to understand given the seemingly pervasive 
and normalized nature of the problem—on one hand, they all 
spoke of experiencing violence, albeit of different kinds, but at 
the same time they were ashamed or embarrassed to tell others. 
 Among women who disclosed the violence, most report-
ed telling their siblings, other relatives, friends, and some told 
their neighbors. Most said that the help they sought was emo-
tional—talking to others as support. Occasionally a friend or 
relative spoke to the husband; some brothers or fathers ‘beat up’ 
the spouse.
I am closest to my sister, so I told her about the violence. I 
did it primarily to get it off my chest, not because she can do 
anything about it. What can she do, after all? She is poor too, 
and lives in a slum. She can’t invite me to stay with her. But 
she can make me feel better. I once told my father about the 
violence; he got really angry and threatened to beat him up. 
But my father is an old man, and there is no point in upsetting 
him. So I told him it wasn’t a big deal, it didn’t hurt that much. 
 In several cases, help was not sought directly by these wom-
en, but came when neighbors in close proximity intervened 
when they heard the sounds of beatings or cries for help:
When he’s angry I don’t do anything. I don’t tell anyone. 
People, however, can see and hear because the slums are so 
crowded and each room is divided by cardboard or plastic 
sheets. Sometimes they intervene, sometimes they don’t. I 
guess it depends on how loud it gets. When they do inter-
vene, he lets me go. I then leave the room. My neighbors, who 
are also my friends, found out about the violence because 
they heard me scream in pain. Since then, my husband tries 
to muffle the sound by placing his hand over my mouth. But 
because they [my neighbors] already know [about the vio-
lence] I go and tell them exactly that. I think once they found 
out I wasn’t ashamed to tell them, because they knew already. 
It’s harder to tell someone who has no idea about the violence.
 When asked about disclosing violence or seeking help from 
their microfinance lending group or other business contacts, the 
response from these microfinance participants was universal: 
165Microfinance, Networks, and IPV in Bangladesh
they did not seek help from their lending group members or 
anyone involved with their micro businesses. The respondents 
reported feeling ashamed, embarrassed, or wary of sharing 
their stories of violence, often expressing that they feared it 
would diminish them in the eyes of their business colleagues.
They are my colleagues, professional connections. I don’t want 
them to have a negative view of me, so I don’t tell them. They 
will think less of me if I tell them about the abuses that my 
husband hurls at me, and the things he hits me with. It is em-
barrassing. I can’t tell them any of that. They know me as a re-
spectable entrepreneur; no need to change that by telling them 
about these things. There really is no reason for me to do so. 
They will think how can I run my business if I can’t run my 
personal life according to my own wishes, if they found out 
about the violence. So obviously I don’t say a word to them. 
 As the women talked about their lending groups, it was 
striking to hear how important these contacts were to them in 
terms of finances and business advice, and how often the wom-
en emphasized that they wanted to keep their “personal dra-
ma” out of these relationships:
In terms of working together, we do great. Sometimes when 
I don’t have money to make the weekly payments [to the mi-
crofinance organization] they help me out, they loan me that 
money, interest free! I have done that for them too, when they 
needed it. It is a good set up. We all get along. I don’t want to 
bring in my personal drama into that. That life with microf-
inance is my other life, my escape. I enjoy that. I don’t want 
to ruin that.
The group members are important because we can help each 
other when we are in a financial bind. There were times 
where I could not make payments and the group paid it on 
my behalf so that they are not ineligible for loans in the fu-
ture. That is how we help each other. To me, this is the most 
important kind of help, because I do not have anyone else in 
my life from whom I can ask for money. For other types of 
help, such as childcare or just having someone to talk to, I 
have my sisters and neighbors. 
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I have realized the significance of having a faithful group 
of people whose main interest is to make sure we all make 
payments on time, which, in the long run, is better for our 
business … It allows us to talk to others in situations simi-
lar to ours. For example, when I bought vegetables for sale, I 
was having a problem with the vegetables rotting early. This 
kept on happening. When I told my group members about 
that, they suggested I buy vegetables that don’t rot easily, like 
potatoes, carrots, and cauliflower. It sounds very simple, but 
I didn’t know which vegetables rot quickly and so my busi-
ness was suffering. I want to keep this kind of a relationship 
alive. If I started talking about personal things, these meet-
ings would become a gossiping session about my husband 
and how awful he is. We will forget to be entrepreneurs and 
focus on the men only. And so, I don’t want to tell them that 
my husband hits me. 
Discussion
 The quantitative results indicated that women who par-
ticipated in microfinance were equally likely to disclose inti-
mate partner violence, compared to a matched group of women 
who did not participate in microfinance. Both groups sought 
help primarily from family and neighbors; very small numbers 
contacted friends, police, or professionals about their IPV. The 
findings from the qualitative study indicated that microfinance 
participants interacted with a range of community contacts as-
sociated with their business ownership; the women described 
“weak” ties with lending group members and others connected 
to their loans or microenterprise. They expressed a preference 
for interacting and presenting themselves in the role of busi-
nesswomen to these professional and community contacts. 
Sharing stories of intimate violence would negatively color their 
personal and professional reputations as entrepreneurs, many 
feared. The women expressed that they wanted to keep their 
personal and business lives separate, because of the shame and 
stigma associated with IPV. 
 Findings from the qualitative sample also indicated that 
expanded social networks associated with microfinance par-
ticipation provided these women with access to valuable infor-
mational and economic resources aligned with their business 
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roles.  These findings from the qualitative sample provide areas 
for future research regarding the instrumental roles of the com-
munity contacts of microfinance participant networks, and may 
suggest an explanation for why IPV disclosure did not vary 
among microfinance participants and nonparticipants in the 
nationally representative sample.  
 This study underscores a paradox: though pervasive and 
often viewed as a normalized component of marriage, IPV dis-
closure beyond family is limited, and—among the qualitative 
sample—was described as a source of shame among all net-
work contacts. Assumptions that community networks associ-
ated with microfinance participation would prompt increased 
IPV disclosure and help seeking did not hold for our samples. 
Though business associates were a source of economic and 
informational resources, they were not, among this sample, a 
source of IPV support. 
 As noted earlier, microfinance organizations provide a range 
of financial and nonfinancial	 services to participants including 
health education, literacy, and legal programs (Kabeer, 2005; 
Westley, 2007), and microfinance participation is associated with 
a variety of social development outcomes, such as children’s edu-
cation and nutrition and contraceptive use (Murshid & Ely, 2016; 
(Pitt & Khandaker, 1998). 
 With access to over 30 million participants in Bangladesh, 
microfinance organizations could include in their educational, 
legal, and community offerings information focusing on IPV 
resources, statutes, and recourse. Microfinance participation 
allows women to navigate the outside world as an economic 
entity, a business owner (Amin, Becker, & Bayes, 1998; Begum, 
2005; Busch & Valentine, 2000; Hunt & Kasynathan, 2001; Vyas 
& Watts, 2009). That increased economic power and personal in-
dependence comprises the essence of the program’s secondary 
goals of empowerment among women (Banerjee et al., 2015). 
 Nevertheless, women’s participation in economic activities 
occurs within the context of deep cultural norms of patriarchy, 
and their experiences with structural violence in spaces both 
within and outside their own homes. Microfinance organiza-
tions have extraordinary community reach; they have formal 
connections and communications with millions of poor wom-
en and their households. Such networks could potentially be 
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tapped as mechanisms for both informational and structural 
change, including communications focused on IPV education, 
laws and legislation, support services, and efforts toward a 
broader shift of expectations and norms. Finally, such an in-
stitution would do well to build a culture of solidarity among 
women who participate in microfinance, as Katherine Rankin 
had suggested almost a decade and a half ago (Rankin, 2002).
Limitations
 The study is limited by the survey questions available from 
the BDHS (NIPORT et al., 2009), which restrict the variables and 
measures accessible for analysis and by its ability to provide 
causal inference; the study, however, is strengthened by the na-
tionally representative sample. The use of PSM methods added 
to the strength of the study by addressing endogeneity and se-
lection biases, but heterogeneity from unobserved confounders 
remains. Another limitation of the quantitative portion of the 
study is that a small portion of the sample reported IPV disclo-
sure, which renders the cell size to be relatively small compared 
to the sample size. However, the small cell size speaks to the 
extent to which IPV remains a taboo, and justifies its analysis.
 The qualitative portion of the study begins to explore the con-
text of microfinance-related social networks and IPV disclosure 
and suggests areas for future research. The qualitative findings 
are not transferrable beyond this purposively drawn sample.
Conclusion 
 Formulated as an anti-poverty effort with goals that span 
economic development, social development, and empowerment, 
microfinance programs have the potential to effect social issues 
such as IPV with their formal connections to micro-units of in-
dividuals and households and to structural economic systems. 
These efforts will be enhanced with continued research that 
builds understanding of women’s experiences and reactions to 
IPV, within the context of their roles in their households, and as 
social entrepreneurs. Community interventions such as microf-
inance programs have the extant infrastructure and leverage to 
build information and awareness among participants and their 
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wider networks, and to be active in IPV policy and enforcement 
initiatives.
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